Where To Spend Money Other Than Juvenile Programs

Circumscribed Youth for Turn a profit*

SEPTEMBER 2015 UPDATE

[Download this policy platform as a PDF. Or, download our safeguards to protect youth who are bars in for-profit facilities.]

Youth in Trouble with the Police are a Public Responsibleness

American public agencies often piece of work with private business to accomplish goals that we as a club have all agreed are for the mutual good, such as repairing our highways, delivering power to our homes, or collecting the trash. That said, nosotros must remember that our authorities and businesses exist for different reasons. While businesses exist to plow a turn a profit, not everything profitable is adept for our communities. One only has to look around to see that a business organisation can be quite profitable without contributing to the social good. This is why our public agencies play a crucial part: our libraries, constabulary enforcement, fire departments, health and safety agencies, parks, and public schools exist because they serve the public proficient –– but few would be if we expected them to be assisting.

And so, while it can make sense to have for-profit businesses provide a service that we as citizens accept identified as a priority, giving command of public services to individual business can be a error. This is because the purpose of a for-turn a profit business is to maximize profits for its shareholders. In many contexts, this tin can exist a powerful engine for success and prosperity. Just when it comes to incarcerating people, giving this responsibility to for-turn a profit businesses is a bad idea.

Confining Youth for Turn a profit Does Not Keep Youth and Communities Prophylactic

The privatization of youth confinement facilities[1] is now widespread in the United States; almost one-half of the youth facilities in the state are privately operated.[ii] While many of these private facilities are owned or operated past non-profits, we focus this policy platform on for-profit facilities, which pose a unique and pregnant hazard to youth. Government agencies and non-profits are often nether-resourced, but their mission is to assist youth and protect the community. By contrast, for-profit youth solitude companies are driven by the lesser line, which means pressure is high to increase the number of youth confined, and to go along costs severely pared downward – not for the public do good, simply for their own profit. Unfortunately, achieving this goal often conflicts with a goal nosotros all concur on: safely providing youth with needed services and rigorous programming in the least restrictive surroundings possible, to ensure they re-enter society as law-abiding citizens, thereby keeping our neighborhoods safe.

We know from research that confining youth is generally ineffective and can even increase the likelihood that they will commit new crimes.[iii] Given this, it is counterproductive to create a profit incentive to increment the number of youth bars or lengthen the term of their incarceration. Furthermore, research has shown that we can help youth change their behavior with quality programming delivered by well-trained staff.[4] All the same for-turn a profit prisons have an incentive to maximize profits by cutting programming costs, staff, and preparation budgets, which undermines the goal of rehabilitating the youth in their care. For these reasons, nosotros believe that youth confinement should remain the responsibility of the public sector, whose purpose is to work for the good of the youth and the community.

Years of experience with for-turn a profit juvenile and adult facilities has demonstrated that privatization frequently leads to a diverseness of outcomes that are very harmful to the welfare of youth and the community. Nosotros have summarized these dangers below.[five]

Harmful Conditions and Violations of Human Rights

• Companies confining youth for-profit have an incentive to spend less money rehabilitating and protecting confined individuals in order to maximize profits — even at the expense of public safety and humane weather. Enquiry suggests that for-profit prisons are associated with heightened levels of violence toward prisoners.[6]
• Examples of calumniating handling and unsafe weather condition in for-profit youth confinement facilities abound – including excessive force involving beatings, kicking, and punching of handcuffed and defenseless youth, frequent utilise of pepper spray, baby-sit-instigated "gladiator-style" fights betwixt youth, unsanitary and insect-infested food, and regular sexual assaults and rapes of youth by guards, likewise equally higher rates of death at private facilities throughout the country.[7]
• Efforts to maximize profits have also led for-profit youth solitude companies to provide youth with inadequate rehabilitative programming, educational activity, and food, as well as poor training and very low pay to staff, resulting in personnel unqualified for the work and high levels of staff turnover.[8]
• Auditors take repeatedly cited two of the largest individual prison companies– Wackenhut (since renamed GEO) and CCA (Corrections Corporation of America) -- for boosted problems, including chronic understaffing, insufficient prisoner work programs resulting in widespread idleness, failure to comply with proper procedures for classifying inmates, substandard medical treatment, and inadequate mental wellness intendance.[ix]
• Putting for-turn a profit companies in charge of confining youth creates many barriers to ensuring that the homo rights of youth bars in private facilities are protected, including a lack of independent monitoring and oversight, lack of transparency regarding data on the conditions of confined youth, facility-imposed restrictions on family unit visitation, and difficulty for legal counsel, families and oversight bodies to visit youth, especially when facilities are located out-of-country.

Reforms Designed to Reduce Overincarceration are Sidelined

• When states privatize youth confinement facilities in an attempt to reduce the high costs of incarceration, it tin divert the attention of policy-makers from making more than constructive and meaningful structural changes to the juvenile justice system. Structural reforms[10] could significantly decrease youth incarceration, ultimately leading to better outcomes for youth and longer term public safe benefits and cost savings.

Companies' Profit Interests Compete Directly with the Freedom Interest of Youth

• For-profit confinement facility operators have a vested interest in keeping their facilities total, which can lead them to base decisions regarding the length of stay and release dates of youth on the companies' needs to meet their bottom line by filling as many beds for every bit long as possible, rather than meeting the rehabilitative needs of the youth and the safety needs of the customs.[eleven]
• For-profit youth confinement companies have been known to skirt the ethical line on budgetary payments to government officials, which can lead to youth being unnecessarily locked up for fiscal proceeds.[12] A example in point is that of Judge Marking Ciaverella in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, who was convicted in a conspiracy involving accepting nearly one 1000000 dollars from a individual juvenile facility developer after sending scores of youth to two private, for-profit facilities.
• For-turn a profit confinement facility companies take engaged in ambitious political strategies, including spending millions on lobbying campaigns and making sizable campaign contributions to promote policies that volition lead to higher rates of incarceration.[13] Examples include for-turn a profit company interest in influencing and drafting "three-strikes" and "truth-in-sentencing" laws.[xiv]

Confining Youth for Profit Carries Hidden Take chances and Costs for the Public

While show of cost-savings from for-profit facilities is mixed at best, many studies have shown that private prisons save the public petty to no money and may even end up costing more than money than public facilities.[xv] Even if some toll savings are realized, cutting costs by shortchanging youth through overcrowded, unsafe weather and failing to provide needed services is a bad deal for youth and the community. Youth are unlikely to render to the community with the skills and education they need to be successful and not recidivate when provided with scant programming and calumniating weather.

Additionally, for-turn a profit privatization involves some "hidden" costs that are often non taken into business relationship when comparing public and private facilities. Governments likewise face significant additional financial risks when utilizing for-profit facilities. When all these additional costs and risks are considered, it is unlikely that the authorities really spends fewer total dollars outsourcing youth confinement to for-turn a profit youth confinement facilities.

• Many for-profit confinement facility contracts contain "guaranteed profit" or "bed occupancy" requirements. This means that the government guarantees that a certain percentage of facility beds – sometimes as high as 80 - 100% – volition be filled, which leads to taxpayers giving millions of dollars to individual companies for extra beds that often are non needed.[16]

• Continual public monitoring of for-profit youth confinement facilities is necessary to ensure that the contractors are held answerable for providing the services stated in their contracts, and to ensure the youth are beingness treated safely and getting the services they need.[17] The cost to the authorities and taxpayers for monitoring contract performance is often not considered when determining whether for-profit privatization volition be less costly.

• Some contracts with for-turn a profit facilities shift service costs to the public sector. For instance, in Arizona, the medical costs for prisoners in private prisons were capped at $10,000 at i point, assuasive the visitor to charge the state for any extra costs or to transfer prisoners to a public facility.[18]

• For-profit prison companies often rely on private acquirement bonds to finance their prison construction; these bonds are secured past local regime entities or financing authorities. Private acquirement bonds are premised upon a guarantee of incoming revenue, unlike authorities general obligation bonds, which are used for a diverseness of government revenue needs. Appropriately, investors in private acquirement bonds demand much higher involvement rates than would exist required for a state general obligation bond. Notwithstanding the land can notwithstanding be on the hook for repaying this more costly debt, or face a downgrade of its bond rating.
• Louisiana legislators plant this out in 2003, when they tried to shut downwards the Tallulah juvenile correctional middle, in which in that location was widespread abuse of youth. The Standard & Poor'south rating agency informed them that if they quit financing the individual prison, information technology would put Louisiana'south bond rating at take chances. Youth were forced to stay bars at Tallulah for an extra year while the bond controversy was resolved and the state figured out a way to repurpose the facility and then they didn't appear to be paying debt on an empty prison.[19]
• In several cases, private prison financiers take facilitated the construction of for-profit prisons in local jurisdictions using revenue bonds. When the supply of prisoners dried up and the for-profit prison visitor abased the project, the towns were left with huge amounts of debt. Finding prisoners has been an increasing trouble for many towns equally the crime rate has fallen and the total correctional population has been going downwardly.[20]

• The potential costs of increased prison litigation due to the dangerous conditions in many individual for-profit confinement facilities can too make for-profit privatization much more costly than the alternative.

• When comparing the costs to house youth in for-turn a profit juvenile confinement facilities versus public facilities, information technology is of import to make sure that yous are comparison apples to apples when assessing the costs of public vs. individual confinement facilities. For example, practise they each include the costs of doing business, such as managing payroll, training new employees, and purchasing equipment?[21]

Confining Youth for Turn a profit is Morally Incorrect

In addition to the practical reasons not to confine youth for profit noted above, profiting from human bondage is morally reprehensible. Given our country's history of legally enslaving and profiting from the labor of people of color, the United States has a special responsibility to avert repeating the by; in this light, confining youth for profit — virtually of whom are youth of color, given the disparate rates at which youth of colour are confined — is especially repugnant. Then, while we have a moral imperative to eliminate the turn a profit motive when it comes to circumscribed all youth, we besides have a special obligation to avoid the echoes of slavery inherent in allowing companies to make money off of confined youth of color.

Recommendation

The National Juvenile Justice Network (NJJN) recommends ending the use of for-profit individual youth confinement facilities. We believe that youth should be served in the least restrictive setting and confined but equally a last resort and for the shortest time possible. Those youth who must exist confined should be treated in safe, salubrious environments — not operated for profit — that are conducive to their pro-social development and successful re-entry into the community. The for-profit youth confinement incentive construction works against these goals by encouraging the incarceration of youth and the minimization of needed services.

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[*] National Juvenile Justice Network (NJJN) policy platforms are developed past a committee of NJJN members and canonical by the full NJJN membership body by a majority vote. Policy platforms practice not necessarily represent the recommendations of each individual NJJN member organization. To view additional NJJN policy platforms, visit world wide web.njjn.org/our-work/our-positions. NJJN thanks the following national experts for their insightful feedback and guidance throughout the development of this platform: Paul Ashton, Michele Deitch, Mishi Faruqee, and Amanda Petteruti.

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[1] For the purposes of this policy platform, we use the term "confinement" to refer to any out-of-home placement of youth stemming from a delinquency or criminal charge, or an gild of a delinquency or criminal court judge. Youth can be confined in detention and jail facilities, prison house and incarceration facilities, long-term secure care solitude, reception and diagnostic centers, shelters, group homes, residential treatment facilities, boot camps, and ranch/wilderness camps. Click here for definitions of any of these terms: http://i.u.s.a..gov/1Nipf7Z.

[ii] Sarah Hockenberry, Melissa Sickmund, and Anthony Sladky, "Juvenile Residential Facility Demography, 2012: Selected Findings" (Washington, DC: US Dept. of Justice, Function of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Washington, DC, March 2015): 2, http://i.us.gov/1GqMIza.

[3] Run across the National Juvenile Justice Network, "The Truth near Consequences" (Washington, DC, 2012), at http://flake.ly/1hGoy7e; see also Tony Fabelo, PhD, Nancy Arrigona, MPA, Michael D. Thompson, Closer to Home: An Assay of the Country and Local Impact of the Texas Juvenile Justice Reforms (Quango of Country Governments Justice Center, January 29, 2015), http://bit.ly/1FSE1fz; Barry Holman and Jason Zeidenberg, "The Dangers of Detention: The Bear upon of Incarcerating Youth in Detention and Other Secure Facilities," (Washington, DC: Justice Policy Institute, Nov. 28, 2006): 2-4, http://www.justicepolicy.org/inquiry/1978; "Arrested Development; Confinement Can Negatively Affect Youth Maturation" (October 2013): 2, http://scrap.ly/1VDMBcQ.

[4] Mark W. Lipsey, et al., "Improving the Effectiveness of Juvenile Justice Programs: A New Perspective on Evidence-Based Practice," (Washington, D.C.: Heart for Juvenile Justice Reform, December 2010), 27-28, http://bit.ly/1LEoiYH.

[5] Annotation that because less research has been done on individual youth confinement compared to individual developed prisons, our information is taken from both sources.

[6] David Shapiro, "Banking on Bondage: Private Prisons and Mass Incarceration" (New York, NY: American Ceremonious Liberties Wedlock, Nov. 2, 2011): 23, http://bit.ly/1HhDXLR. A 2001 Bureau of Justice Administration (BJA) national survey found that "there were 65 percent more inmate-on-inmate assaults and 49 percent more than inmate-on-staff assaults in individual prisons than in comparable public prisons." See  Judith A. Greene, "Lack of Correctional Services: The Agin Upshot on Human Rights," in Capitalist Penalisation: Prison Privatization and Human Rights, eds. Andrew Coyle, Rodney Neufield, and Allison Campbell (Clarity Press, 2003); 12-13, http://fleck.ly/1f6mhbJ; citing Jane Austin and Garry Coventry, "Emerging Issues on Privatized Prisons," (Washington, DC: National Quango on Crime and Delinquency and U.S. Dept. of Justice, Part of Justice Programs, Agency of Justice Assistance, February 2001), http://1.usa.gov/1HhEwFr.

[7] Cristina Parker, Judy Greene, Bob Libal, and Alexis Mazon, "For-Profit Family Detention: Meet the Private Prison Corporations Making Millions by Locking Up Refugee Families" (Justice Strategies and Grassroots Leadership, Oct 2014): 5-6, 8, http://fleck.ly/1KaQcuh.

[8] Shapiro, "Banking on Chains" 27-9; Xochitil Bervera, "The Decease of Tallulah Prison," Allternet, June 24, 2004, http://bit.ly/1fCd4rw; A 2003 study found that the loftier turnover rate of prison guards in private prisons was reaching crisis proportions with a turnover rate of 52 percent in 2000 compared to 16 percent for public prisons. Run across Greene, "Lack of Correctional Services," ten.

[nine] Greene, "Lack of Correctional Services," 11.

[10] Examples of structural reforms tin be found in NJJN's policy platform "Reducing Youth Confinement" (August, 2014), at http://bit.ly/1ucy0EI.

[xi] James Swift, "100 Percentage Privatized," Uncommon Journalism (Dec. eight, 2013): 3, http://fleck.ly/1GqN3Sr.

[12] Shapiro, "Cyberbanking on Bondage," 32-iii.

[xiii] Paul Ashton and Amanda Petteruti, "Gaming the System: How the Political Strategies of Private Prison Companies Promote Ineffective Incarceration Policies" (Washington, D.C., Justice Policy Establish, June 22, 2011): 2, http://chip.ly/1HhEkWz; Shapiro, "Banking on Bondage," 38-40; Parker, et al., "For-Profit Family unit Detention," 10.

[fourteen] Ashton & Petteruti, "Gaming the System," 3; Donald Cohen, "Jailing Teenagers and the Poisoning of Public Purpose," Huffington Postal service, March eighteen, 2009, http://huff.to/1LCnNwf.

[15] Shapiro, "Banking on Bondage," 19; Texas Criminal Justice Coalition, "Privatization of Correctional Operations and Services" (May 2011): 1, http://chip.ly/1Iu8mYj, citing Austin and Coventry, "Emerging Issues on Privatized Prisons." Also see Usa General Bookkeeping Office, "Private and Public Prisons: Studies Comparing Operational Costs and/or Quality of Service," (Washington, D.C., Report to the Subcommittee on Criminal offence, Committee on the Judiciary, Business firm of Representatives 1996), http://one.u.s..gov/1f2V8q1.

[16] In the Public Interest, "Criminal: How Lockup Quotas and 'Low-Crime Taxes' Guarantee Profits for Private Prison Corporations" (September 2013): 6, http://bit.ly/1M7UQZd.

[18] Kevin Pranis, "Price-Saving or Toll-Shifting: The Fiscal Impact of Prison Privatization in Arizona" (Justice Strategies, 2005): 13, http://flake.ly/1GyZbQC.

[nineteen] Pranis, "Price-Saving or Cost-Shifting," 16; Kevin Pranis, "Opinion:  Paying for Private Prisons, Part Ii" Pagosa Springs Daily News, June 14, 2012, http://bit.ly/1R5Xcyi.

[20] Texas Criminal Justice Coalition, "Privatization," two, citing John Burnett, "Private Prison Promises Go out Texas Towns in Problem," National Public Radio, March 28, 2011, http://north.pr/1CboooO.

[21] For example, for a breakdown of some of the additional costs and revenues that can be associated with detention heart performance, run into National Juvenile Justice Network, "Financial Policy Eye Toolkit: How to Calculate the Average Costs of Detaining a Youth" (Washington, DC: May 2013): 3, http://bit.ly/1T7O7T8.

Source: https://www.njjn.org/our-work/confining-youth-for-profit--policy-platform

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